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Privacy-Preserving Policy Synthesis in Markov Decision Processes
Parham Gohari, Matthew Hale and Ufuk Topcu
Abstract—In decision-making problems, the actions of an
agent may reveal sensitive information that drives its decisions.
For instance, a corporation’s investment decisions may reveal
its sensitive knowledge about market dynamics. To prevent this
type of information leakage, we introduce a policy synthesis
algorithm that protects the privacy of the transition probabili-
ties in a Markov decision process. We use differential privacy
as the mathematical definition of privacy. The algorithm first
perturbs the transition probabilities using a mechanism that
provides differential privacy. Then, based on the privatized
transition probabilities, we synthesize a policy using dynamic
programming. Our main contribution is to bound the “cost of
privacy,” i.e., the difference between the expected total rewards
with privacy and the expected total rewards without privacy.
We also show that computing the cost of privacy has time
complexity that is polynomial in the parameters of the problem.
Moreover, we establish that the cost of privacy increases with
the strength of differential privacy protections, and we quantify
this increase. Finally, numerical experiments on two example
environments validate the established relationship between the
cost of privacy and the strength of data privacy protections.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many decision-making problems, agents desire to pro-
tect sensitive information that drives their actions from eaves-
droppers and adversaries, such as applications in autonomous
driving or smart power grids [1], [2]. In these applications, as
well as in many other sequential decision-making problems,
choosing actions can be cast as a policy-synthesis problem
wherein the environment is modeled as a Markov decision
process (MDP) [3], [4]. The goal in a policy-synthesis
problem is to find a reward-maximizing control policy based
on the transition probabilities of the underlying MDP. In this
work, we study the problem of synthesizing a policy that
protects the privacy of the transition probabilities.
Transition probabilities in an MDP govern the dynamics
of the environment and may carry information that should
be protected during policy synthesis. For example, suppose
that through market research, a corporation discovers a niche
in the market and decides to invest. Such an investment may
alert competitors to the discovered niche and leads to other
firms making similar decisions. Previous works in economics
have associated higher market shares with profitability [5],
[6]. Therefore, competitors’ entrance to the market may be
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harmful to the investing corporation. As a result, it is often
crucial for a decision-maker to choose actions that do not
reveal its knowledge about its environment dynamics.
We use differential privacy as the definition of privacy
for an MDP’s transition probabilities. Differential privacy,
first introduced in [7], is a property of an algorithm and has
been used in the computer science literature as a quantitative
definition of privacy for databases [8], [9]. It has also
recently been used in control theory [10], [11]. Differential
privacy makes it unlikely that the output of a differentially
private algorithm will reveal any useful information about
the individual entries of the input dataset; however, it may
still pass on information about the aggregate statistics of the
input dataset that are useful in down-stream analytics.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a policy-
synthesis algorithm that enforces differential privacy for
transition probabilities with adjustable privacy and utility.
We define the utility of a privacy-preserving policy synthesis
algorithm to be the value function associated with the policy,
which in an MDP is its expected total reward [12]. Utility
loss due to privacy is a common phenomenon, and we follow
the convention in the differential privacy literature to analyze
the utility of the privacy-preserving algorithm by comparing
it to its non-private counterpart [13], [14].
In order to show that the algorithm enforces differen-
tial privacy, we exploit the fact that differential privacy
is immune to post-processing [13]. By immunity to post-
processing, we mean that arbitrary functions of the output
of a differentially private algorithm do not weaken its pri-
vacy guarantees. The algorithm first privatizes the transition
probabilities via the Dirichlet mechanism [15]. We then
use dynamic programming to synthesize a policy based on
the privatized transition probabilities. Since the dynamic
programming stage is an act of post-processing on the output
of a differentially private mechanism, its output preserves the
differential privacy provided to transition probabilities.
We employ the Dirichlet mechanism for privatization
because it preserves the unique structure of the transition
probabilities, i.e., vectors with non-negative components that
sum to one. Using traditional differentially private mecha-
nisms that add infinite-support noise to transition probabil-
ities are ill-suited to this work as they break the structure
of transition probabilities. For example, they can result in
a transition probability vector with negative components.
Although normalization may seem a fitting solution in order
to project the perturbed vector back onto the unit simplex, we
avoid normalization because it makes it difficult to quantify
utility.
We introduce the “cost of privacy” as a measure of
the utility of the algorithm. We define the cost of privacy
to be the difference between the expected total rewards
of the policy with privacy and that of the same policy
without privacy. Since we perturb the transition probabilities
to enforce differential privacy, the output of the dynamic-
programming stage is susceptible to suboptimality, which the
cost of privacy quantifies.
We bound the cost of privacy for both finite- and infinite-
horizon MDPs. For finite-horizon MDPs, we show that we
can compute the cost of privacy in polynomial time via
a backward-in-time recursive algorithm. For the case of
infinite-horizon MDPs, we show that an algorithm similar to
policy evaluation converges to the cost of privacy asymptoti-
cally. We further show that the number of iterations required
to approximate the cost of privacy is polynomial in problem
parameters. This work enables a decision-maker to control
the level of privacy based on the utility loss that they are
willing to tolerate.
In order to empirically validate the expressions that we
introduce for the cost of privacy, we run the algorithm on
two example MPDs. The first example is a small MDP that
models a corporation’s investment. The second example is an
MDP with a larger state and action space, with its transition
probabilities generated randomly. We run the algorithm at a
range of privacy levels and visualize our results by plotting
the cost of privacy versus privacy level. The results illustrate
the trade-off that we establish between the strength of data
privacy and utility. Furthermore, we observe that the bounds
we provide for the cost of privacy are meaningful in the
sense that they empirically provide a close approximation to
the cost of privacy.
Related work. The works in [16]–[18] study the problem
of learning a policy in an MDP while enforcing differential
privacy. The key difference between this paper and the works
above is that we protect the transition probabilities which
belong to the probability simplex, whereas the other works
protect the sensory data that are scalars. We emphasize that
although scalars can be readily privatized using traditional
differentially private mechanisms, transition probabilities
need to be treated specially to ensure that they remain non-
negative and sum to one.
The problems of robust and distributionally robust MDPs
are related to this paper. Robust policy synthesis in an
MDP is the problem of synthesizing a policy that mitigates
uncertainties present in transition probabilities [19], [20].
Distributionally robust MDPs assume that the planner has
access to a probability measure over the uncertainty sets [21].
We base the cost of privacy bounds on a concentration
bound that we derive for the output of the Dirichlet mecha-
nism. Finding the worst-case cost of privacy coincides with
lower bounding the value of a distributionally robust policy
where the uncertainties in the transition probabilities adhere
to the concentration bound of the Dirichlet mechanism.
Despite the fact that the solutions take similar forms, this
paper studies the value loss due to privacy, whereas the
problem of robust policy synthesis tries to compute a policy
that mitigates the effect of uncertainties.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we set the notation and definitions used
throughout the paper.
A. Notation
We denote the set of real numbers by R. Let (·)T denote
the transpose of a vector. We define the unit simplex to be
∆(n) := {x ∈ Rn | 1Tx = 1, x ≥ 0}, where 1 is the vector
of all ones in Rn and the inequality is evaluated element
wise. We use the notation ∆◦(n) to denote the interior of
∆(n). For a finite set A, its cardinality is denoted by |A|.
E[·] and Var(·) denote the expectation and the variance of a
random variable, respectively. ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖∞ denote the
one and infinity norm of a vector, respectively. For a vector
p, we use the notation pi to denote the i
th component of p.
We use the gamma function
Γ(z) :=
∫ ∞
0
xz−1 exp (−x)dx.
B. Markov decision processes
An MDP is a tuple M = (S,As, r,P , T, γ) where S is
the set of states, As is the set of available actions at state
s ∈ S, and r : S × As 7→ R is the reward function that
indicates the one-step reward for taking action a at state
s. P := {P (s, a) ∈ ∆(|S|) | (s, a) ∈ S ×As} is the set of
transition probabilities. Finally, T is the time horizon and γ
is the discount factor.
We now define a policy, that is, a rule for making a
sequence of decisions in an MDP. In particular, let ht :=
{s0, a0, r0, s1, a1, r1, . . . , st} be a history until stage t, and
let Ht(st) denote the set of all possible histories that end in
state st. A policy π : Ht(st) 7→ ∆(|Ast |) maps a history ht
to a probability distribution over the set of actions, Ast .
A policy π is evaluated by its value function V pit : S 7→ R,
that is defined as
V pit (s) := E
[
T∑
i=t
γi−tri
∣∣∣∣∣ st = s
]
.
The expectation is taken over the stochasticity of the policy
π and transition probabilities P . We study the problem
of privacy-preserving policy synthesis, and in a synthesis
problem, the goal is to find an optimal policy, in the sense
that it achieves the highest value function beginning at initial
state s0.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to Markovian
policies, i.e., the class of policies that only depend on the
most recent state of the history. Markovian policies are
shown to be optimal under some mild conditions [22]. We
use the notation πt(a | s) to show the probability of taking
action a at state s and stage t.
C. Differential privacy
For an algorithm that satisfies differential privacy, it is
unlikely to tell apart nearby input datasets based on obser-
vations of the algorithm’s output. Nearby datasets are defined
formally by an adjacency relationship. We first state the
adjacency relationship used in this paper.
Definition 1 (From [15], Definition 1). For a constant b ∈
(0, 1], two vectors p, q ∈ ∆(n) are said to be b-adjacent if
there exist indices i, j such that
p−(i,j) = q−(i,j) and ||p− q||1 ≤ b.
The above definition considers two vectors in the unit
simplex adjacent if they only differ in two indices, i, j, by no
more than b in their 1-norm. Note that the usual adjacency
relationship in the differential privacy literature considers
two input datasets adjacent if they only differ in one entry
[13]; however, it is not possible for the elements of the unit
simplex to differ in only one entry because their components
must sum to one.
Definition 2 (Probabilistic differential privacy [15]). Fix a
probability space (Ω,F ,P) and b ∈ (0, 1]. A mechanism
M : ∆(n)×Ω 7→ ∆(n) is said to be probabilistically (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private if, for all p ∈ ∆(n), we can partition
the output space ∆(n) into two disjoint sets, Ω1,Ω2, such
that P[M(p) ∈ Ω2] ≤ δ, and for all q ∈ ∆(n) b-adjacent to
p, we have that
log
(
P[M(p) = x]
P[M(q) = x]
)
≤ ǫ, ∀x ∈ Ω1.
Probabilistic (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is known to imply
ordinary (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [23].
D. The Dirichlet mechanism
A Dirichlet mechanism with parameter k > 0 takes as
input a vector p ∈ ∆◦n and outputs x ∈ ∆(n) according to a
Dirichlet probability distribution. Fix k and let M
(k)
D denote
the Dirichlet mechanism. Then
P
[
M
(k)
D (p)=x
]
=
1
B(kp)
n−1∏
i=1
xkpi−1i
(
1−
n−1∑
i=1
xi
)kpn−1
,
where
B(kp) :=
n∏
i=1
Γ(kpi)
Γ
(
k
n∑
i=1
pi
)
is the multi-variate beta function.
The Dirichlet mechanism satisfies probabilistic (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy [15], and has the following properties.
The expected value of the output is equal to the input
vector, i.e., E
[
M
(k)
D (p)
]
= p. An increase in k results in
weaker differential privacy protections, and in particular it
increases ǫ. However, as k increases, the output becomes
more concentrated around the input vector p.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SYNTHESIS ALGORITHM
In this section, we first present the proposed privacy-
preserving synthesis algorithm. Then, we show the differ-
ential privacy of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving synthesis algorithm
Input: (S,As, r,P , T, γ), k
Output: π¯, V¯ p¯i
1 Construct the set of privatized transition probabilities
P¯ :=
{
P¯ (s, a) =M
(k)
D (P (s, a)) | P (s, a) ∈ P
}
.
2 Replace M with its privatized version
M¯ :=
(
S,As, r, P¯ , T, γ
)
3 Synthesize policy π¯ for M¯.
4 Compute the value function of π¯, V¯ p¯i.
A. Algorithm
The algorithm takes as input an MDP representation
M = (S,As, r,P , T, γ) and the value of k that is the
parameter for the Dirichlet mechanism. It outputs a pol-
icy π¯ and its value function V¯ p¯i. The algorithm com-
prises two stages. The first stage privatizes the transition
probabilities by applying the Dirichlet mechanism inde-
pendently on each transition probability vector in P . Let
P¯ :=
{
P¯ (s, a) =M
(k)
D (P (s, a)) | P (s, a) ∈ P
}
be the set
of transition probabilities after privatization. The second
stage finds an optimal policy and the optimal value of the pri-
vatized MDP M¯ :=
(
S,As, r, P¯ , T, γ
)
. An optimal policy
is one that satisfies the Bellman condition of optimality, and
the optimal value is the value of such policies [22]. In the
case of a finite-horizon MDP, the second stage finds (π¯, V¯t)
such that for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} and all s ∈ S,
V¯t(s)=max
pi
∑
a∈As
π(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)V¯t+1(s
′)
)
,
π¯t∈argmax
pi
∑
a∈As
π(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)V¯t+1(s
′)
)
,
where P¯ (s, a, s′) denotes the privatized probability that tak-
ing action a at state s takes the agent to state s′. We assume
that the terminal values are given by a known function
RT : S 7→ R, i.e., V¯T (s) = RT (s), for all s ∈ S.
For an infinite-horizon discounted MDP, it can be shown
that the optimal policy is a stationary policy, i.e., a policy
that adopts the same decision rule at all stages [22]. Let V¯∞
denote the optimal value of M¯. Then, for an infinite-horizon
MDP, the second stage of Algorithm 1 computes (π¯, V¯∞)
such that for all s ∈ S,
V¯∞(s)=max
pi
∑
a∈As
π(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)V¯∞(s
′)
)
,
π¯∈argmax
pi
∑
a∈As
π(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)V¯∞(s
′)
)
.
There are various methods suggested to efficiently compute
π¯ and its value function, such as dynamic programming or
linear programming [22]. The third and the fourth step of
Algorithm 1 may adopt any of these methods to synthesize
and evaluate an optimal policy for the privatized MDP M¯.
B. Proof of differential privacy
We prove that Algorithm 1 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private
by differential privacy’s immunity to post-processing.
Lemma 1 (From [13], Proposition 2.1). Let M : ∆(n) 7→
∆(n) be a mechanism that is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Let
f : ∆(n) 7→ R be an arbitrary mapping. Then, f ◦ M :
∆(n) 7→ R is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Recall that probabilistic (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy implies
ordinary (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Let (ǫˆ, δˆ) denote the level
of the probabilistic differential privacy of the Dirichlet mech-
anism employed in Algorithm 1. By Lemma 1, the algorithm
is (ǫˆ, δˆ)-differentially private because the synthesis step is an
instance of a post-processing mapping f .
IV. UTILITY ANALYSIS
Recall that Algorithm 1 synthesizes a policy π¯ based on
privatized transition probabilities in P¯ . It then computes the
value function of π¯, V¯ p¯it , using P¯ . Let V
p¯i
t : S 7→ R be the
value function that the non-private transition probabilities in
P assign to π¯. The utility of Algorithm 1 is equal to V p¯i(s0).
We assume that after the privatization stage, the algorithm
loses access to the non-private transition probabilities in P .
The reason is that in many real-world applications, a central
cloud is used to compute the policy, and agents submit their
data to the cloud [24], [25]. For agents to preserve their data
privacy, they privatize their data prior to any submission to
the cloud [26].
Had we had access to the non-private transition proba-
bilities P , V p¯i(s0) could have been computed using an off-
the-shelf policy evaluation algorithm. We start off the utility
analysis of Algorithm 1 with introducing a concentration
bound on the output of the Dirichlet mechanism.
Lemma 2. Let M
(k)
D denote a Dirichlet mechanism with
parameter k ∈ R+. Then, for all β > 0, and all p ∈ ∆
◦(n),
P
(∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
≥
√
log (1/β)
2(k + 1)
)
≤ β.
Proof. See Appendix I. 
The above lemma enables us to evaluate V p¯i(s0),
i.e., the conditional expectation of the value func-
tion without privacy, based on the privatized tran-
sition probabilities P¯ and k. In particular, for a
finite-horizon MDP we provide an upper bound on∣∣E [V p¯i0 (s0) | P¯ , k]− V¯ p¯i0 (s0)∣∣. For an infinite-horizon MDP,
we upper bound
∣∣E [V p¯i∞(s0) | P¯ , k]− V¯ p¯i∞(s0)∣∣. We refer to
both expressions as the “cost of privacy.”
The bounds are based on the pessimistic and optimistic
value functions that possible transition-probability vectors
generate. Let α :=
√
log(1/β)/2(k + 1), then Lemma 2
implies that for all P (s, a) ∈ P and the corresponding
P¯ (s, a) ∈ P¯ , P
(
||P¯ (s, a)− P (s, a)||∞ ≤ α
)
≥ 1 − β. We
define Pˆα,β as
{βP1(s, a)+(1−β)P2(s, a) | ‖P2(s, a)− P¯ (s, a)‖∞ ≤ α,
P1(s, a), P2(s, a) ∈ ∆(|S|), (s, a) ∈ S ×As} (1)
We use the set Pˆα,β to compute a pessimistic and optimistic
value function to bound the cost of privacy.
A. Finite-horizon MDPs
We bound the cost of privacy for a finite-horizon MDP
by establishing a common upper and lower bound for both
E
[
V p¯i0 (s0) | P¯ , k
]
and V¯ p¯i0 (s0). We first state a technical
lemma that we later use to prove the main theorem of this
section.
Lemma 3. Fix k and a set of transition probabilities P ,
and let P¯ :=
{
P¯ (s, a) =M
(k)
D (P (s, a)) | P (s, a) ∈ P
}
.
For any β > 0, let α :=
√
log(1/β)/2(k + 1). Then,
P¯ (s, a) ∈ Pˆα,β, ∀P¯ (s, a) ∈ P¯,
E
[
P (s, a) | P¯, k
]
∈ Pˆα,β, ∀P (s, a) ∈ P .
Proof. See Appendix II. 
Theorem 1. LetM = (S,As, r,P , T, γ) and k be the input,
and (π¯, V¯ p¯it ) be the output of Algorithm 1, and let T < ∞.
Fix β > 0, and let α :=
√
log(1/β)/2(k + 1). Let RT :
S 7→ R denote the terminal value function of M. Define
¯
vp¯it : S 7→ R and v¯
p¯i
t : S 7→ R as follows. For all s ∈
S, let v¯p¯iT (s) := RT (s), ¯
vp¯iT (s) := RT (s), and for all t ∈
{0, . . . , T − 1}, let
¯
vp¯it (s):=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ min
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)
¯
vp¯it+1(s
′)
)
,
v¯p¯it (s):=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ max
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)v¯p¯it+1(s
′)
)
.
Then, we have that∣∣E [V p¯i0 (s0) | P¯ , k]− V¯ p¯i0 (s0)∣∣ ≤ v¯p¯i0 (s0)− ¯vp¯i0 (s0).
Proof. We first show by induction that for all stages t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , T }, and all states s ∈ S,
¯
vp¯it (s) lower bounds
V¯ p¯it (s). Since all terminal values are determined by RT ,
we have that for all states, V¯
p¯i
T (s) = ¯
vp¯iT (s) = RT (s). Let
τ ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, and assume that for all states, we have
that V¯ p¯iτ (s) ≥ ¯
vp¯iτ (s). Then, for t = τ − 1, and for all s ∈ S,
we can write
V¯ p¯iτ−1(s)=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)V¯ p¯iτ (s
′)
)
≥
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)
¯
vp¯iτ (s
′)
)
≥
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ min
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)
¯
vp¯iτ (s
′)
)
(2)
=
¯
vp¯iτ−1(s).
The first inequality immediately results from the induction
hypothesis. For the second inequality, note that by Lemma
3, P¯ (s, a) ∈ Pˆ ; therefore, P¯ (s, a) is a feasible solution of
the minimization problem in (2).
By induction, we conclude that for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T },
and all s ∈ S,
¯
vp¯it (s) lower bounds V¯
p¯i
t (s), which includes
stage t = 0 and state s = s0, hence, V¯
p¯i
0 (s0) ≥ ¯
vp¯i0 (s0).
An identical argument by reversing the direction of the
inequalities and substituting the minimization in (2) with
maximization, leads to v¯p¯it (s) upper bounding V¯
p¯i
t (s), for all
s ∈ S and all t ∈ {0, . . . , T }. So far we have established
that
¯
vp¯i0 (s0) ≤ V¯
p¯i
0 (s0) ≤ v¯
p¯i
0 (s0). (3)
We now consider the value of π¯ based on the non-private
transition probabilities in P , that is denoted V p¯i. Recall that
for all stages t ∈ {1, . . . , T } and all states s ∈ S, V p¯it (s)
satisfies the following conditions: V p¯iT (s) = RT (s) and
V p¯it−1(s)=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P (s, a, s′)V p¯it (s
′)
)
.
Taking the expectation of both sides, we arrive at
E
[
V p¯it−1(s)
∣∣ P¯, k] =∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)V p¯it (s
′)
∣∣ P¯ , k]
)
.
In order to to establish an iterative relation between the
values of E
[
V p¯it−1(s)
∣∣ P¯, k] for different stages, we need to
break the expectation on the right-hand side of the above
equation. Consider the scenario wherein at each stage, the
transition probabilities are independently privatized using the
Dirichlet mechanism. Let V˜ p¯i denote the value function that
is associated with π¯ according to the above scenario. Due to
the independence assumption, we can write
E
[
V˜ p¯it−1(s)
∣∣∣ P¯ , k] = ∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+
γ
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)
∣∣ P¯, k]E [V˜ p¯it (s′) ∣∣∣ P¯ , k]
)
.
Assume that for an arbitrary τ ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} and for
all s ∈ S, it holds that E
[
V˜ p¯iτ (s
′) | P¯ , k
]
≥
¯
vp¯iτ (s). Then, for
t = τ − 1, it holds that
E
[
V˜
p¯i
τ−1(s)
∣∣∣ P¯ , k] ≥
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)
∣∣ P¯ , k]
¯
vp¯iτ (s
′)
)
.
By Lemma 3, E
[
P (s, a) | P¯ , k
]
belongs to the set Pˆα,β .
Therefore we can write
E
[
V˜
p¯i
τ−1(s) | P¯, k
]
≥
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
min
p∈Pˆα,β
p(s, a, s′)
¯
vp¯iτ (s
′)
)
=
¯
vp¯iτ−1(s).
Therefore, by induction, we have shown that for all stages
and all states,
¯
vp¯i is a lower bound to E
[
V˜
p¯i
| P¯ , k
]
.
We now revisit the independence assumption. We intro-
duce the worst-case expected value function that possible
transition probabilities can generate as the lower bound to the
value function of the generated policy without privacy. The
independence assumption leads to independent minimization
problems at each stage. The worst-case value function with-
out the independence assumption has the following restric-
tion on the transition probabilities. Transition probabilities
that appear as a minimization variable for the same state-
action pair at different stages must take equal values. Since
the feasible region of the case without independence is a
subset of that of the case with independence, the lower bound
for E
[
V˜ p¯i | P¯, k
]
also lower bounds E
[
V p¯i | P¯ , k
]
.
Similarly, an identical argument by reversing the direction
of the inequalities, and substituting the min operators with
max operators leads to E
[
V˜
p¯i
| P¯ , k
]
≤ v¯p¯i , for all stages
and all states. Therefore,
¯
vp¯i0 (s0) ≤ E
[
V p¯i0 (s0) | P¯ , k
]
≤ v¯p¯i0 (s0). (4)
Combining (3) and (4) concludes the proof. 
The assumption of independence has also been adopted in
[19]–[21] wherein the problem of robust MDPs is studied.
In the above works, the scenario wherein the independence
assumption holds is called the dynamic model and the
counterpart scenario is called the static model. See Section
2.2 of [19] for further details about the relationship between
the static and the dynamic model.
B. Infinite-horizon MDPs
In this section, we bound the cost of privacy for an infinite-
horizon MDP. We first state a technical lemma, which we
later use to bound the cost of privacy for infinite-horizon
MDPs.
Lemma 4. Fix k and an MDPM = (S,As, r,P , T, γ), and
let P¯ :=
{
P¯ (s, a) =M
(k)
D (P (s, a)) | P (s, a) ∈ P
}
. For
any β > 0, let α :=
√
log(1/β)/2(k + 1). Define mappings
L1,L2,L3 : R
|S| × R|S| as
L1v :=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ min
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)v(s′)
)
,
L2v :=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)v(s′)
)
,
L3v :=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)v(s′)
∣∣P¯, k]
)
.
Then, mappings L1, L2, and L3 are γ-contraction mappings,
i.e., for all v1,v2 ∈ R
|S| and i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
‖Liv1 − Liv2‖∞ ≤ γ ‖v1 − v2‖∞ .
Proof. See Appendix III. 
Theorem 2. LetM = (S,As, r,P , T, γ) and k be the input,
and (π¯, V¯ p¯i∞) be the output of Algorithm 1, and let T = ∞.
Fix β > 0, and let α :=
√
log(1/β)/2(k + 1). For all s ∈ S,
let
¯
vp¯i∞ : S 7→ R and v¯
p¯i
∞ : S 7→ R satisfy
¯
vp¯i∞(s)=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ min
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)
¯
vp¯i∞(s
′)
)
,
v¯p¯i∞(s)=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ max
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)v¯p¯i∞(s
′)
)
.
Then, we have that∣∣E [V p¯i∞(s0) | P¯ , k]− V¯ p¯i∞(s0)∣∣ ≤ v¯p¯i∞(s0)− ¯vp¯i∞(s0).
Proof. Consider the γ-contraction mappings L1, L2 and
L3 introduced in Lemma 4. Notice that
¯
vp¯i∞, V¯
p¯i∞ and
E
[
V p¯i∞(s0) | P¯ , k
]
are the fixed points of mappings L1, L2
and L3, respectively. Contraction mappings are known to
admit a fixed point by Banach fixed-point theorem. Further-
more, contractive mappings converge to their fixed points
by applying the mapping repeatedly to an arbitrary initial
v ∈ R|S|. Let v
(k)
i denote the k
th iteration corresponding to
Li, and let all three mappings start from a common initial
vector. Assume that at stage k, it holds that v
(k)
1 ≤ v
(k)
2 ,
then for stage k+1, with a similar argument to the proof of
Theorem 1, we can write
v
(k+1)
2 (s)=
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)v
(k)
2 (s
′)
)
≥
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)v
(k)
1 (s
′)
)
≥
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ min
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)v
(k)
1 (s
′)
)
= v
(k+1)
1 (s).
As a result, we have that the limiting value of vk1 and v
k
2
when k →∞ also satisfy
¯
vp¯i∞ = lim
k→∞
v
(k)
1 ≤ lim
k→∞
v
(k)
2 = V¯
p¯i
∞.
Using a similar argument, it can be shown that V¯ p¯i∞ is upper
bounded by v¯p¯i∞. Therefore we have that
¯
vp¯i∞ ≤ V¯
p¯i
∞ ≤ v¯
p¯i
∞. (5)
We now assume that at stage k, it holds that v
(k)
1 ≤ v
(k)
3 . At
stage k + 1, we write
v
(k+1)
3 (s) =∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)v
(k)
3 (s
′)
∣∣∣ P¯ , k]
)
.
Notice that there is no stochasticity in v
(k)
3 . Therefore, we
have that
v
(k+1)
3 (s) =∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)
∣∣ P¯ , k] v(k)3 (s′)
)
.
The above equation combined with the induction hypothesis
implies that
v
(k+1)
3 (s) ≥∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
(
r(s, a)+γ
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)
∣∣ P¯ , k] v(k)1 (s′)
)
.
By Lemma 3, we have that v
(k+1)
3 ≥ v
(k+1)
3 . Therefore,
¯
vp¯i∞ = lim
k→∞
v
(k)
1 ≤ lim
k→∞
v
(k)
3 = E
[
V p¯i∞(s0) | P¯ , k
]
. (6)
With a similar argument, it can be shown that v¯p¯i∞ upper
bounds E
[
V p¯i∞(s0) | P¯ , k
]
, which combined by (5) and (6)
concludes the proof. 
V. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
In the previous section, we introduced expressions that
bound the cost of privacy for both finite- and infinite-horizon
MDPs. The bounds do not take a closed form, and they are
computed by iterative methods. In this section, we show that
the cost of privacy for both cases can be computed efficiently.
In particular we show that for both cases, the computational
complexity is polynomial in problem parameters.
A. Finite-horizon MDPs
Revisiting the definition of
¯
vp¯it and v¯
p¯i
t in Theorem 1,
the inner minimization or maximization problem must be
solved for each of T stages and |S| states. We first consider
computing the lower bound
¯
vp¯it . Fix (s, a) ∈ S × As and
t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. Then the inner minimization problem
can be recast as
min
P1,P2,p∈R|S|
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)
¯
vp¯it (s
′) (P)
subject to 1TP1(s, a) = 1, P1(s, a, s
′) ≥ 0, ∀s′ ∈ S,
1
TP2(s, a) = 1, P2(s, a, s
′) ≥ 0, ∀s′ ∈ S,
1
T p(s, a) = 1, p(s, a, s′) ≥ 0, ∀s′ ∈ S,
P2(s, a, s
′)− P¯ (s, a, s′) ≤ α, ∀s′ ∈ S,
P2(s, a, s
′)− P¯ (s, a, s′) ≥ −α, ∀s′ ∈ S,
βP1(s, a) + (1 − β)P2(s, a) = p(s, a).
The above optimization problem is a linear program (LP)
with 3|S| variables and 6|S| + 3 constraints. Similarly, the
inner maximization problem in v¯p¯it can be cast as an LP by
negating the objective function in (P).
There exists numerous algorithms for solving an LP,
each of which is associated with different computational
complexities. We consider the interior-point method that is
known to solve an LP in polynomial time, O(n3.5), where n
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Fig. 1: Plots a and b show all the value functions that are used to compute and validate the cost of privacy for Examples 1
and 2. The third plot shows the cost of privacy itself for both examples.
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Fig. 2: The corporation’s investment model with four possi-
ble startups to acquire, given as an MDP.
is the number of variables [27]. Therefore, the computational
complexity of computing the cost of privacy for a finite-
horizon MDP is O
(
T |S|4.5|As|
)
.
B. Infinite-horizon MDPs
in Lemma 4, we introduced L1 that is a γ-contraction
mapping. Suppose there exists a constant R ∈ R+ such
that the reward function of the underlying MDP satisfies
|r(s, a)| ≤ R, for all (s, a) ∈ S × As. Then, all the value
functions including the private, non-private, optimistic, and
the pessimistic value function must be bounded above by
a constant vmax. Let v
(k)
1 be the value of the k
th iteration
corresponding to L1, and v
∞
1 be the limiting value. We can
write ∥∥∥v(k+1)1 − v∞1 ∥∥∥
∞
≤ γ
∥∥∥v(k)1 − v∞1 ∥∥∥
∞
.
The above inequality is equivalent to∥∥∥v(k)1 − v∞1 ∥∥∥
∞
≤
γk
1− γ
∥∥∥v(1)1 − v(0)1 ∥∥∥
∞
≤ 2vmax
γk
1− γ
.
The above inequality indicates that in order to reach an
ǫ-approximation of the limit, O(log(1/ǫ)) iterations are
required. The inner minimization problem is identical to the
finite-horizon case, which we reformulated as an LP in (P).
Combining the above arguments together, we conclude that
the required number of iterations such that ‖v
(k)
1 −¯
vp¯i∞‖∞ ≤
ǫ, is O
(
|S|4.5|As| log (1/ǫ)
)
. The same computational com-
plexity holds for the upper bound v¯p¯i∞. As a result, the cost
of privacy for infinite-horizon MDPs can be computed in
polynomial time as well.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we empirically validate the developments
of previous sections, wherein we introduced the expressions
that compute the cost of privacy and their corresponding
computational complexity. We apply Algorithm 1 to two ex-
ample MDPs at a range of k values, which represent a range
of privacy protection levels. The first is a small-sized MDP
that represents a simple model for a corporation’s investment
planning. The second example is an MDP with a larger state
and action space, which has transition probabilities, reward
function, and terminal reward function generated randomly.
For both examples, the algorithm is run 50 times, and Figure
1, which depicts the results, shows the mean values alongside
their standard deviations that appear as error bars.
Example 1. Suppose a corporation has been tracking
four startups, and it has to decide which startup to acquire.
Assume that the corporation’s model of each of the startup’s
probability of success is given by the MDP in Figure 2.
The first empirical result of this section corresponds to
applying the algorithm to the scenario described in Example
1, and is depicted in Figure 1a. The results show that as
k increases, the pessimistic and optimistic value functions
provide better bounds for the private and non-private value
functions. Therefore the cost of privacy decreases with k,
which Figure 1c confirms.
Example 2. In this example, we apply the algorithm to a
larger MDP in order to test its scalability. In particular, the
MDP has 20 states, 5 actions available at each state, and a
time horizon of 10.
Similar to the previous example, Figure 1b indicates that
an increase in k improves the approximations of the private
and non-private value functions by v¯p¯i0 (s0) and ¯
vp¯i0 (s0). As
a result, the cost of privacy must decrease with k, which is
confirmed by Figure 1c.
In Example 2, the computation of the cost of privacy for
each instance of k took 4.88s on a desktop computer with a
3.5GHz CPU and 24GB of RAM. Doubling the time horizon
of the MDP to 20 results in 9.34s/itr, and doubling the size
of the action space to |As| = 10 results in 9.68s/itr, which
is consistent with the computational complexity introduced
in Section V.
For both examples, the negative correlation between k
and the cost of privacy is consistent with the developments
in Section IV. By Lemma 2, an increase in k results in a
tighter concentration bound on the output of the Dirichlet
mechanism, and it lowers α in Theorems 1 and 2. A smaller
α further restricts the inner optimization problem in (P); thus,
it helps the optimistic and the pessimistic value functions to
provide better approximations, which leads to a lower cost
of privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced a privacy-preserving policy synthesis al-
gorithm that protects the privacy of the transition probabil-
ities of its input MDP. The algorithm employs a Dirich-
let mechanism to privatize the transition probabilities. We
established a concentration bound on the output of the
Dirichlet mechanism based on its scaling parameter k. We
used the concentration bound to bound the cost of privacy
imposed by privatizing the transition probabilities. We further
showed that the cost of privacy can be computed efficiently
by establishing that the computational complexity of the
algorithm is polynomial in problem parameters. Finally, the
simulation results validated the developments in both the
soundness of the expressions we introduced for the cost of
privacy and the computational complexity associated with
computing them.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let p ∈ ∆◦(n) and k > 0. From the properties of the
Dirichlet mechanism we have that E
[
M
(k)
D (p)
]
= p. Let
u ∈ ∆(n) and λ ∈ R+. By Theorem 3.3 in [28], we have
that
E
[
exp
(
λuT
(
M
(k)
D (p)− E
[
M
(k)
D (p)
]))]
≤
n∏
i=1
E
[
exp
(
λui
(
M
(k)
D (p)i − pi
))]
.
Let beta(a, b) denote the beta distribution with parameter
(a, b). It can be shown that each component of the Dirichlet
mechanism satisfies
M
(k)
D (p)i ∼ beta(kpi, k(1− pi)).
Recall that a random variable X is said to be R-subgaussian
if it satisfies
E [exp (sX)] ≤ exp
(
R2s2
2
)
, ∀s ∈ R.
A beta distribution with parameters (a, b) is√
1/4(a+ b+ 1)-subgaussian [28]. Therefore,
n∏
i=1
E
[
exp
(
λui
(
M
(k)
D (p)i − pi
))]
≤
d∏
i=1
exp
(
λ2u2iσ
2
i
2
)
= exp
(
λ2‖u‖2
8(k + 1)
)
.
Since u can be any vector in ∆(n), we consider an instance
of u that puts weight 1 on the component of M
(k)
D (p) − p
with maximum magnitude and zero elsewhere. Considering
the case where λ = 1, we can write
E
[
exp
∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
]
≤ exp
(
1
8(k + 1)
)
. (7)
Finally, for all θ ≥ 0, we have that
P
(∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
≥ α
)
=
P
(
exp
(
θ
∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
)
≥ exp (θα)
)
.
By Markov’s inequality,
P
(
exp
(
θ
∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
)
≥ exp (θα)
)
≤
E
[
exp
(
θ
∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
)]
· exp (−θα) .
Combining the above inequality with (7), we arrive at
P
(∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
≥ α
)
≤ exp
(
θ2
8(k + 1)
− θα
)
.
Taking θ = 4α(k+1) and a proper change of variable from
α to β concludes the lemma.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In the definition of Pˆα,β in (1), take P1(s, a) := P¯ (s, a),
and P2(s, a) := P¯ (s, a). Then, βP1(s, a)+(1−β)P2(s, a) =
P¯ (s, a) is within the set Pˆα,β , which concludes the first
result.
For a given β, by Lemma 2, there exists β′ ≥ β, such that
P
(∥∥∥M(k)D (p)− p∥∥∥
∞
≥
√
log (1/β′)
2(k + 1)
)
= β.
Define α′ :=
√
log(1/β′)/2(k + 1) and let
P1(s, a) := E
[
P (s, a)
∣∣ P¯ , k, ‖P (s, a)− P¯ (s, a)‖∞ ≥ α′] ,
and
P2(s, a) := E
[
P (s, a)
∣∣ P¯ , k, ‖P (s, a)− P¯ (s, a)‖∞ ≤ α′] .
Since α′ ≤ α, ‖P2(s, a)−P¯ (s, a)‖∞ ≤ α. Then, βP1(s, a)+
(1 − β)P2(s, a) = E
[
P (s, a) | P¯ , k
]
is also within the set
Pˆα,β , which completes the proof.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let U, V ∈ R|S|. Then, for all s ∈ S, we can write
L1U(s)− L1V (s) =γ
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)·
(
min
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)U(s′)− min
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)V (s′)
)
.
For all (s, a) ∈ S ×As, let
p∗(s, a) = argmin
p∈Pˆα,β
∑
s′∈S
p(s, a, s′)V (s′).
Then,
L1U(s)− L1V (s) ≤ γ
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)·
∑
s′∈S
p∗(s, a, s′)(U(s′)− V (s′))≤γmax
s∈S
|U(s)− V (s)| .
(8)
For mapping L2, we have that
L2U(s)− L2V (s) =γ
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)·
(∑
s′∈S
P¯ (s, a, s′)(U(s′)−V (s′))
)
≤γmax
s∈S
|U(s)−V (s)| .
(9)
Finally, for L3, we write
L2U(s)−L2V (s) =γ
∑
a∈As
π¯(a |s)
∑
s′∈S
E
[
P (s, a, s′)
∣∣ P¯ , k] ·
(U(s′)−V (s′))≤γmax
s∈S
|U(s)−V (s)|. (10)
Notice that ‖U − V ‖∞ = max
s∈S
|U(s)−V (s)|, and that (8),
(9) and (10) hold for any s ∈ S. Thus, L1, L2 and L3 are
γ-contraction mappings.
